Irving Fisher, the Debt-Deflation Theory, and the Crisis of 2008-2009 by Quiviger, Zacharie
Undergraduate Economic Review 
Volume 16 Issue 1 Article 22 
2019 
Irving Fisher, the Debt-Deflation Theory, and the Crisis of 
2008-2009 
Zacharie Quiviger 
McGill University, zacharie.quiviger@mail.mcgill.ca 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer 
 Part of the Finance Commons, and the Macroeconomics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Quiviger, Zacharie (2019) "Irving Fisher, the Debt-Deflation Theory, and the Crisis of 
2008-2009," Undergraduate Economic Review: Vol. 16 : Iss. 1 , Article 22. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol16/iss1/22 
This Article is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital 
Commons @ IWU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this material in any 
way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For 
other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights 
are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/ or on the work itself. This material 
has been accepted for inclusion by faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, 
please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu. 
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document. 
Irving Fisher, the Debt-Deflation Theory, and the Crisis of 2008-2009 
Abstract 
Irving Fisher’s 1932 Booms and Depressions presents a fully specified, nine-pronged model of financial 
crises that has been widely forgotten by modern macroeconomists. This article builds on the renewed 
interest in Fisher’s Debt-Deflation Theory to explore its pertinence to the Great Recession. By parsing 
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n the wake of the 2008-2009 crisis, some economists, standing on the rubbles of the 
world economy, turned to a somewhat-forgotten name to elucidate the failings of 
markets and policies alike. In a 2009 column, Enrique Mendoza, professor at the 
University of Pennsylvania, wrote, comparing Irving Fisher’s debt-deflation mechanism to 
competing recession theories, that “today, […] there is no doubt that Fisher was right and that 
the rest are just stories.” Paul Krugman, in 2008, commented that Fisher’s debt-deflation was 
“what’s happening now.” In 2009, The Economist opined that the crisis would pull Fisher 
“out of Keynes’s shadow.” 
 With a decade of hindsight, one can investigate the extent to which Fisher’s debt-
deflation theory truly analytically describes the 2008-2009 meltdown. Yet, limited effort has 
been exerted in academia in doing so – flowery rhetoric aside. This article, in mounting this 
task, avoids two common practices. First, it escapes a reductionist view of Fisher’s theory 
that lessens it to a single-minded study of its two fundamental variables, debt and the price 
level. Second, it considers Fisher’s Booms and Depressions (1932) – not The Debt-Deflation 
Theory of Great Depressions (1933) – as its foundational text since, by Fisher’s own words, 
the latter only aims at “embodying, in brief,” the former (1933, p. 337). 
 
THE DEBT-DEFLATION THEORY OF GREAT DEPRESSIONS 
 
Defunct economists’ words form fractious terrains for their modern counterparts. Do Adam 
Smith’s writings lend support to present-day free markets advocates? What is the essence of 
Keynes’ general theory? Fisher’s theory is no outlier; its author himself, after all, described it 
as “quite tentative” (1933, p. 337). While this complexity is acknowledged, it matters still for 
the purpose at hand to delineate what I have observed to constitute the Debt-Deflation 
Theory. The following arguments are summarized in Figure 1. In Booms and Depressions 
(1932), Fisher enumerates nine “main factors” in depressions:1 over-indebtedness; the 
volume of currency; the general price-level; net worths; profits; production, trade, and 
employment; pessimism; the velocity of circulation; and the rate of interest.  
The economy starts in a state of over-indebtedness, defined by widespread balance 
sheet solvency issues (p. 9). When economic agents awake to this state of affair, assets are 
voluntarily sold off by debtors in deleveraging efforts or seized by creditors and liquidated; 
this is distress selling (p. 14). The resulting excess supply directly decreases the price of 
assets. Yet, Fisher argues that this “excessive eagerness on the selling side […] is not the 
fundamental influence” on the price-level (p. 14). Rather, the general fall in the price-level is 
engendered by a reduction in the volume of deposit currency. As debtors settle loans with 
 
1 “Depression” is Fisher’s term for business cycle slumps and is used in this article despite the 
2008-2009 crisis being widely designated as a recession. Note that citations in this section are 
from the book unless they are cited as from “1933.” 
I 
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banks and withdraw deposits in doing so, the circulating medium contracts; in times of 
distress selling, “new borrowings will by no means suffice to restore the balance” (p. 15). It 
follows that the price-level tumbles as “with less funds, less buying can be accomplished” (p. 
16). Here enters the money illusion: agents fail to realize that money itself is swelling and, as 
such, nominal debt contracts remain fixed (p. 18). Accordingly, net worths deteriorate as 
liabilities hold steady and assets plunge.  
Crippling balance sheets entail that the initial over-indebtedness problem is further 
exacerbated. This cycle from over-indebtedness to price-level and back is the core of Fisher’s 
theory. Crucially, it exhibits positive feedback; this tendency to drift away from equilibrium 
inspired Fisher’s famous analogy to a capsizing ship (1933, p. 339). 
 The falling price-level is the fulcrum upon which the debt problem reaches the real 
economy. As prices sink, profits follow because expenses – taxes, rent, wages, and salaries – 
are somewhat inflexible in the short-run (p. 30). Profits are further diminished by the 
deflation-induced rise in the real rate of interest hampering demand and increasing real costs 
(p. 38). Decreasing profit is falling income and thus inhibits debt repayment and further 
contributes to incentivizing distress selling. More importantly, lower profits lead to diving 
production, trade, and employment as businesses cut “current output” and “construction” 
(investment). Fisher writes: “in a capitalistic […] system, it is the profit taker who usually 
makes the decision as to the rate at which his enterprise is to be run. Therefore, variations in 
profits […] lead the business man to vary correspondingly the general policy of his 
enterprise” (p. 30-31). As the slowdown propagates, job losses induce further distress selling. 
The economy is in depression. 
 Finally, Fisher argues that pessimism causes currency hoarding, and, accordingly, a 
reduction in the velocity of circulation (p. 34). This accelerates the fall in the price-level. The 
reader may notice that pessimism has been modeled as a box that encompasses all other 
factors. As Fisher indicates, “all of the down movements thus far mentioned – […] net-worth, 
profits, and employment – have psychological effects (p. 33).  
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
To assess Fisher’s contribution to our understanding of the Great Recession, this article 
presents an empirical analysis and a literature review. This section highlights broad 
macroeconomic metrics to determine if Fisher’s nine main factors indeed varied as he had 
predicted. The approach hopefully will remind the reader of the graphing exercise offered in 
conclusion of Fisher’s 1933 article. Its focus is placed on the US, the patient zero. An 
assessment of the appropriateness of the debt-deflation positive feedback loop is included.  
The initial condition of Fisher’s theory is over-indebtedness. As such, we would 
expect to find a build up in debt before distress selling and other problems unfolded. To avoid 
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pinpointing this juncture arbitrarily, a trend break analysis is carried out on the time series of 
delinquency rates on residential mortgages. Stata identifies the break to happen in Q3 of 
2006; the associated Wald test returns a p-value of 0.000 on the null hypothesis that the data 
is continuous. In the four years before, the empirical data (Panel 1) shows clear and steep 
increases in mortgage debt outstanding (63.9%), mortgage debt payments as a percentage of 
disposable income (17.7%), and household debt to GDP (8.4% in previous 6 quarters). These 
indicate that American households’ ability to finance their debt – especially mortgages – was 
indeed deteriorating. The data also exhibits the expected harbingers of distress selling: 
delinquency rates shot up after 2006 and nominal mortgage loan debt started falling in Q2 of 
2008 hinting at deleveraging (Panel 1).  
For monetary measures, velocity acted like Fisher had expected but not aggregates 
(Panel 2). M1 velocity fell starting in Q2 of 2008. The concomitance with the fall in nominal 
mortgage debt lends credence to Fisher’s argument that pessimism slows velocity. The M1 
stock, however, rises throughout the recession. Fisher’s analysis does not endogenize 
monetary policy; in the real world, on the other hand, the Fed began to cut its policy rate as 
early as Q3 of 2007. Whereas the M1 stock reflects this expansionary policy, there is 
evidence that “deposit currency” would have shrank ceteris paribus: starting in Q4 of 2008, 
commercial bank loans to commerce and industry dove. Regardless, by Fisher’s own 
transaction quantity theory of money (1911), a fall in velocity alone could engender the 
subsequent projected fall in prices (Panel 3). 
 CPI inflation slipped in Q4 of 2008 and was negative in the first three 
quarters of 2009. Interestingly, housing prices fell much earlier (from Q1 of 2006) 
and much more (39.8% in two years). It seems that market supply and demand (the 
loop’s inner arrow in Figure 1) were more important in depressing asset prices than 
monetary variables were in engendering general deflation, especially since Shiller 
argues that CPI deflation was mainly a result of diving commodity prices in 2009 
(2011). Once again, this is only inconsistent with Fisher’s theory if not allowing for 
reactive monetary interventions. As predicted, asset deflation yielded decreases in 
wealth (Panel 4). Household net worths began decreasing in Q3 of 2007. Market 
capitalizations (proxied by the S&P 500) came tumbling down in Q4 of 2007. 
 So far, it has been shown that the four main factors constituent of the debt-
deflation loop moved in the chronology and direction that Fisher had foreseen 
(Figure 2). There is also evidence of positive feedback or that the “dollar disease” 
reignited the “debt disease.” From Q2 of 2006, total mortgage debt quarterly 
percent change, at 3.2% initially, diminished to reach -0.5% in Q3 of 2008. In the 
same span, however, nominal residential prices were falling by a quarterly average 
of 2.7%. For this period, I calculated the differences between the former and the 
latter (Figure 3). A difference of zero indicates that mortgage debt changed by the 
same factor as nominal housing prices while a positive (negative) value indicates 
an increase (decrease) in the ratio of housing debt-to-equity in the period taking 
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Panel 2A: Velocity and Volume of Currency 
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Panel 6: Rate of Interest 
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Panel 8: Production, Trade, and Unemployment 
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both prices and nominal debt into account. The values computed were indeed 
historically high corroborating that attempts to deleverage were self-harming at 
first, though the measure came down in Q2 of 2009. This is a rough metric too: 
decreases in mortgage debt include defaults which indicates that the statistics would 
have been even higher for the population of non-defaulters only. 
 Close attention was paid to chronology until now because it was imperative 
to demonstrate the functioning of the debt-deflation loop. Fisher, however, clarifies 
that the other variables are not subject to strict chronological order because “a 
depression may be said to be full of tangles and cross-currents” (1932, p. 41). 
Corporate profits fell drastically (Panel 5) starting in Q2 of 2007. There is evidence, 
as Fisher was arguing, that profits might have fallen in part because costs did not 
adjust to slowing inflation. Average hourly earnings did not fall. Tax rebates were 
included in the Bush and Obama stimuli, but the statutory corporate rate of 35% 
remained. WTI prices nearly doubled in the year following the dawn in the plunge 
of profits. Electricity prices kept on a positive secular trend. Rents paid increased 
in 2007. Relatedly, while the Bank Prime Loan Rate (for the dwindling 
creditworthy borrowers) decreased with the Fed funds rate, other commercial rates 
initially did not budge (Panel 6). For example, at Q4 of 2008, the five years fixed 
mortgage rate stood only a meager 39 basis points lower than 5 quarters before 
when the Fed began bolstering M1. Pessimism was rampant both among consumers 
and producers (Panel 7).  
Through this complex web of interactions, the recession had arrived: 
employment and real GDP were both sinking (Panel 8). Thus, all nine of Fisher’s 
main factors co-moved as he had theorized with the necessary addition, at times, of 
endogenous monetary policy. Further, the investigation also found evidence for the 
chronology of the debt-deflation loop including a build-up of indebtedness before 
the crisis and positive feedback between debt burden and distress selling. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
There have been many interesting modern re-interpretations of Fisher’s work. A 
look at citations per year indicates that his contributions had begun resurfacing in 
the 2000s and returned in force after the crisis (Figure 4). I share here some writings 
that shed more light on the extent to which Fisherian theories can help us understand 
2008-2009. Nakamura (2013) argues that Fisher’s institutional approach, most 
emphasized in his 1911 book The Purchasing Power of Money, can help us 
understand the leading up to the crash, especially on the supply side of the mortgage 
market. In the 1960s and 1970s, when Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae could not 
unload their long-term fixed mortgages on investors, government officials created 
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mortgage-backed securities. This was the birth of mortgage securitization which 
led to the infamous CDOs. Often, SEC credit requirements could only be met with 
ratings provided by Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations 
enhancing the importance of the fraudulent Standard & Poor’s, Fitch, and Moody’s. 
Nakamura also writes that limitations on depository banks (e.g. the Glass-Steagall 
act), while arguably beneficial by themselves, led to the growth of unregulated 
parallel institutions as the economy was financializing. Similarly, Betz (2014) 
argues that Fisher’s theory of financial crises had been well internalized by 
lawmakers. Rather, the inability to prevent the crash resulted from regulators’ lack 
of visibility into a complex layered financial structure. 
Fazzari & Caskey (1989), Wolfson (1996), and Shiller (2011) all agree that 
Fisher was wrong to focus strictly on deflation and that unexpected “decline in the 
rate of inflation would serve the same analytic purpose” (Wolfson, p. 317). This 
insight clarifies how Fisher’s mechanism took hold in 2008 despite only a short 
stint of deflation. By the Fisher equation, ailing inflation increases real rates 
exacerbating the debt disease. It also works to reduce profits as firms remain locked 
in nominal cost contracts negotiated when they held higher inflation expectations. 
Shiller reminds us of Fisher’s support for indexation schemes to combat this 
“money illusion.”  
Bordo (2008) and Bhattacharya et al. (2015) credit Fisher for his comments 
on the psychology of borrowers in times of debt build up. Bhattacharya et al., 
specifically, construct a model of financial instability in which borrowers are 
Bayesian learners that update their beliefs about future returns by observing the 
sequence of past ones. This conceptualization is helpful in analysis of the bubbling 
up in mortgage debt in the 2000s and is indeed similar to Fisher’s description of the 
debtor: “his psychology is not that of the unfortunate. His mood is not fear, gloom, 
or caution. It is enthusiasm and hope” (1932, p. 45). It might however more closely 
resemble Keynes’ argument that “the facts of the existing situation enter, in a sense 
disproportionately, into the formation of our long-term expectations” (1936, p. 75). 
 There have also been attempts at including Fisher’s insights into 
paradigmatic Walrasian DSGE models. King (1994) uses heterogeneous agents to 
model debt-deflation in an RBC setting to show it could lead to falling aggregate 
demand and output. Bianchi & Mendoza (2010) construct a model with collateral 
constraints on debt. When the constraint is binding, they show exogenous 
productivity shocks lead to fire sales, debt-deflation amplification, and financial 
crises. This is an attempt to formally define Fisherian over-indebtedness and to 
reconcile Fisher with RBC theory by postulating productivity shocks as the trigger 
of distress selling. The paper also fills holes in Fisherian theory: as Minsky 
remarked, “Fisher does not identify any systematic properties which will transform 
‘bearable debt’ into ‘over-indebtedness’” (1982, p.382). Assous uses Tobin’s 
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disequilibrium model (1975) to argue that “the process of price adjustment in 
Fisher’s 1933 analysis remains unstable as long as government does not intervene” 
(2013, p. 320). This further contributes to our understanding of how mild deflation 
triggered Fisherian mechanisms in 2008. 
 These inclusions, however, are naturally reductionist and often limited to 
simplified debt-deflation processes. In fact, Fisherian theory does not mix well with 
DSGE models: debt-deflation is fundamentally a study of disequilibrium and 
unilaterality; it entails non-neutral money unlike RBC models; it has no 
microeconomic foundations; it considers psychological factors that are difficult to 
mathematicise; and it favours accuracy over precision. These efforts are also 
symptomatic of what Caballero has coined “bringing the periphery [of economics] 
into the core” (2010, p. 8). He contends that the rational expectations assumption 
of DSGE models “becomes increasingly untenable as we continue to add the 
realism of the periphery into the core” (p. 8). In other words, Caballero would insist 
that this approach – the inclusion of insights from Fisher into paradigmatic DSGE 
models – is doomed from the start in its alleged attempt to capture the full richness 
of Fisher’s contributions. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As this paper has tentatively claimed, the data of the 2008 crisis fits Fisher’s Debt-
Deflation Theory well. It could be argued that Fisher’s enthusiasm for monetary 
intervention was excessive – this could be tied to his belief that deflation, and not 
only slowed inflation, was needed for his theory to take hold. It is also true that 
Fisher’s contribution is best understood as a treatise on how depressions start; little 
is said of subsequent slumping once debt-deflation elapses (Q2 of 2009 according 
to the metric of this paper). Keynes’ General Theory provides better answers here. 
What has been shown, however, is that, during the Great Recession, all main factors 
outlined in Booms and Depressions moved according to Fisher’s prognosis. 
Crucially, this paper unearthed evidence that debt-deflation spiraling occurred and 
that Fisher’s chronological claims were followed.  
Fisher can inform the discipline of economics today, both in content and 
method. This article has advocated that this is best accomplished not by focusing 
on narrow aspects of the Debt-Deflation Theory, but by dusting off the whole 
model. If Fisher fails to gain a foothold in 21st century macroeconomics, historians 
of economic thought might at least find solace in the 2008 crisis confirming the 
grandeur of his contributions to the science of the 20th century. 
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